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filiation is the name given by Edward Said to thai realm of nature or "life" that defines what is
historically given to us by birth, circumstance or upbringing. Affiliation represents the process
whereby filiative ties are broken and new ones formed, within cultural systems that constitute
alternative sources of authority or coherence ("Secular Criticism" 16-20). The fiction of J. M.
Coetzee can be described in terms of the way it embodies this shift; from the early work, in
which colonialism is the stony ground on which consciousness and identity are formed, to the
later, in which the inter-textual networks of literature are explored for their promise of partial,
qualified forms of freedom.
It would be a mistake, however, to read Life and Times ofMichael K and Foe as a-historical
departures from the more socially critical Dusklands and In the Heart cf the Country.
Affiliation is itself a historical process; it is the place where biography and culture meet. In
Coetzee, it is also, among other things, a way of upholding a particular kind of critical
consciousness, one that is always alert to both the disingenuous exercise of power, and the
disingenuous representation of power. 1 In this essay, I am concerned with a small portion of
the movement from filiation to affiliation within the corpus of Coetzee's novels: its beginnings
in Dusklands.
"My name is Eugene Dawn. I cannot help that Here goes." So begins Coetzee's snuggle
with the biographical past and with his experience of America in the late sixties. The opening
sentences of Dusklands present a subject that can only bear the consequences of its own social
identity, that must undergo its history, even though the leap into this realm of necessity, and its
consequences, cannot be exactly calculated.
Coctzcc's struggle with colonialism at this stage leads into existentialism, both the Sartrean
categories of being-in-itself and being-for-itself, and the formal, Beckettian paradoxes2 of
expression and negation. What is curious about the existentialist tendencies of the early fiction,
however, is that they are incorporated eclectically, along with the influence of linguistic
movements such as structuralism and generative grammar^ , so that existentialism itself never
stands as a hallmark of the early work but finds its place sometimes in tension with these other
elements. This is especially true of/n the Heart cf the Country, where the historicity and the
fictionality of self continually impact against one another, but it is also true of Dusklands, in
which problems of selfhood and identity are marked by the capaciousness of discourse itself.
At this point, far from being in conflict with one another, the oncological and historical
questions in the fiction are posed simultaneously, as a diagnostic and critical exercise. It is
partly the concern of the first two novels to show that the ontological indeterminacy of the
colonial ego is the result ofits historical situation. As Sartre puts it in Being and Nothingness:
"And the one who I am—and who on principle escapes me—I am he in the midst of the world
in so far as he escapes me" (263). Sartre qualifies (his particular sense of being-in-the-world by
adding that it is governed by colonial, generational, professional, class and other relations, just
as it is governed by relations with particular individuals (279).4 It is perfectly logical that
problems of filiation will express themselves in ontological language; it might also be said that
the historicisation of identity could represent the first stage of the movement away from the
givens of filiation.
A measure of authorial struggle in Dusklands is evident in the very construction of the
historical ground in terms of the broad narrative of colonialism. One of the first ruses of all
colonial self-representations, after all, is to find ways of harmonising and naturalising the
relationship of the colonist to the new landscape and its inhabitants (White Writing 8); seen in
this light, Coetzee's candid deployment of the narrative of colonialism is itself an attempt to
break through the crust of contemporary ideology. The two parts of Dusktaiuls disturb
respectively American self-confidence concerning the global defence of democracy (a policy
consolidated during the Truman adminstration and given considerable effect under Kennedy:
Eugene Dawn writes his Vietnam Report for the Kennedy Institute in the Harry S. Truman
library); and the only slightly more fantastical white South African presumption about
representing an historical link with Western, civilised values on a barbaric continent, a notion
fed by the mythology of the frontier. An important feature of this critique is Coetzee's refusal
to offer some easy vantage point from which one might gaze upon the historicised subject with
flattering self-possession. Like Eugene Dawn, the narrating subject resides in its history.
Since no other time-frame is given—as with Frcdrie Jameson's model of the political
unconscious—history is known to us only in its effects, in the language in which the subject
speaks itself. In this way, the critique strikes home, and as a moral imperative, it addresses
itself to the naturalised structures that maintain their hold over the contemporary
consciousness.5
Critics of Dusklands with historical sensivities have registered misgivings about the
juxtaposition of the narrative of Eugene Dawn, in the context of the Vietnam war, with that of
Jacobus Coetzee, in the context of eighteenth century Dutch colonialism at the Cape,* We
should be cautious, however, about taking such misgivings to their obvious polemical
conclusion, that is, to the point of inferring that Coetzee wishes first of all to mount a •
philosophically idealist or universalist diagnosis of western imperialism. For in both narratives,
solipsism and narcissism, the pitfalls of philosophical idealism, are seen explicitly in terms of
the colonist's failure to engage in reciprocal relationships. Moreover, when Jacobus Coetzee
expounds on the metaphysics of the gun, declaring that "guns save us from the fear that all life
is within us" (84), to circumvent the ethics that partly constructs such a formulation, is surely
evasive. Teresa Dovey's idea, on the other hand, that the juxtapositioning of the narratives is
designed to problematic the concept of history through the principle of repetition (Lacanian
Allegories 67) has some validity if it refers to positivist conceptions of history, but It makes
light of the actual pressures that the narrative responds to. What connects the narratives is the
sense of estrangement and possibly, complicity, that Coetzee begins to feel as a white South
African with an Afrikaner pedigree studying in Texas during the escalation of the Vietnam war.
Coetzee has said that complicity was "not the problem" at the time: "complicity was far too
complex a notion for the time being—the problem was with knowing what was being done. It
was not obvious where one went to escape knowledge" ("How I learned about America" 9).
The complicity, however, is partly what the novel, four or five years later, undertakes to
explore.7 Coetzee connects his current life-history and his ancestry, finding ways, in other
words, of making sense of the contiguity of American and Dutch imperialism in determining his
own historical situatioa
What circumstances demanded was an effort of will and intelligence to render explicit the
historical connections that were evident everywhere, but had yet to be defined. If the silted
layers of non-recognition were to be dredged out, the effort would have to be essentially ami-
positivist (and by implication, anti-humanist). In this, Coetzee was lucky to have increasingly
found his moment in the intellectual revolt against positivism and humanism in the West,
specifically in continental structuralism and generative grammar, In coming to Dusklands,
however, the resources—such as the historical documents which are parodied in both
narratives—could not have immediately fallen into place.
THE REVOLT AGAINST RATIONALITY
The most telling feature of Dusklands is its revolt against rationality. This revolt has been
seen by Michael Vaughan as a rebellion against liberal positivism, primarily, as a rejection, that
is, of liberal aesthetics—aesthetics in Vaughan1 s analysis having epistemological andpolitical
implications ("Literature and Politics" 126). Broadly, though I do not share all of Vaughan's
premises, I share this conclusion, and it is perhaps worth noting that liberal positivism is
possibly the historically dominant form of rationality that Coetzee is confronting, in his own
immediate circumstances within the academy. However, Coetzee goes back to the sources of
this positivism, employing two main lines of attack: firstly, historicisation, and secondly, the
laying bare of the now historicised subject-positions of his narrators.
Historicisation takes the form of returning positivism to the moment of Western scientific
rationality, essentially to Descartes. Hugh Kennel's description of Beckett's subversive parody
of Cartesian rationality will help us to define this aspect of Coetzee's project more closely:
. . . the Beckett trilogy [Molloy, Malone Dies and The Unnamable] takes stock of
the Enlightenment, and reduces to essential terms the three centuries during which
those ambitious processes of which Descartes is the symbol and progenitor (or
was he too, like The Unnamable, spoken through by a Committee of the
Zeitgeist!) accomplished the dehumanizan'on of man. The Cartesian Centaur [the
cyclist, as representative of a perfect harmony of mind and body-as-machine] was
a seventeenth century dream, the fatal dream of being, knowing, and moving like
a god. In the twentieth century he and his machine are gone, and only a desperate
elan remains: "I don't know. 111 never know, in the silence you don't know, you
must go on, I can't go on, I'll go on."
(Samuel Beckett m)
Unlike Beckett, however, and despite his influence, Coetzee's path does not lead from the
skeptic's historicised reconstruction of the cogito to an empty space where form must try to
register pure doubt, or where all attempts to capture meaning seem clownish or bitterly vacuous;
in Coetzee, the process is taken in another direction, which sees those founding philosophical
moments in world-historical terms. These include both the observation that the period of
scientific ascendency coincides with colonial expansionism, and the conviction, or moral
intuition, that in the twentieth century the process is coming to an end with decolonization: the
beginning of the process is therefore seen from the perspective of its end.
Hence "Dawn" as the supposedly autonomous T of what is also the bourgeois capitalist
moment, the moment of Crusoe (although "Eugene" also means noble or well-born and is as
American as Eugene McCarthy) finds himself in the "dusklands" of history, attempting to re-
establish a crumbling edifice by means of the "New Life Project"" "The Vietnam report," says
Dawn, "has been composed facing east into the rising sun and in a mood of poignant regret
(poindre, to pierce) that I am rooted in the evening lands" (7). In the narrative of Jacobus
Coetzee, the violence associated with the assertion of scientific rationality in the colonies is
explored in various forms, both epistemic and physical. Although the allegorical markers
cannot be as explicit as they are in the first narrative, the eighteenth century frontiersman
nevertheless registers all the pressures of twentieth century African nationalism and anti-
colonialism. Coetzee's framework anticipates very closely Jameson's more recent account of
the beginnings of the sixties—as a period of diverse and fundamental shifts or "breaks" of
consciousness—in the "third world" movements for decolonization ("Periodising the 60s"
180-186).
The two philosophers who have been mentioned most often in criticism as providing
Coetzee with some of his terms in Dusklands are Hegel, and Spengler. As Teresa Dovey
shows, the most pertinent section of the Phenomenology of Mind is Che master/slave dialectic.
It is necessary here to say that the master/slave dialectic ought to be seen in the light of Hegel's
critique of essential Enlightenment concepts, a critique which shows that the consciousness of
freedom—the highest goal of human thought—is impossible outside of society; subsequent
references to Hegel in psychoanalytic thinking have tended to obscure the original force of the
dialectic. (This is not the case in Sartre's phenomenological-existentialist discussion of the
Look in Being and Nothingness, later taken up by Frantz Fanon; see Jameson, "Periodising the
60s" 188.) At another, perhaps deeper level, Coetzee has dearly absorbed the basic Hegelian
proposition that it is possible for human thought to make collective progress, though with the
original qualification that in the absence of social reciprocity the possibility of progress is
vitiated; in Coetzee's novel, we are reminded again and again that consciousness of freedom is
impossible in the epistemic conditions of colonialism, and the drive for transcendance
repeatedly founders.
In the case of Spengler, mentioned by Don Maclennan (175-176) and later Dovey (67). the
connection has been thought to be largely titular, the idea of "duskiands" being derived from
The Decline of the West and possibly, though it seems unlikely, Nietzche's The Twilight of the
Gods —one would also add the Wagnerian gOtterdHmmerung. There is certainly more at least to
Spengler's influence than this. The Decline of the West begins with a set of distinctions that
run deep in the early fiction, and are still discoverable in Life and Times of Michael K. In
Spengler, in the analysts of history and culture, chronological is distinguished from
mathematical number, and "pragmatic" history from "the morphological relationship that
inwardly binds together the expression-forms of of all branches of a Culture" (6), Even in his
use of a linguistic analogy, Spengler is a proto-structuralist who would have been congenial in
Coetzee's efforts to grasp systemic rules. Thematically, Spengler is significant in his
distinction between the world-as-nature and the world-as-history, a distinction that has behind it
the classic Heideggerian distinction between being and becoming (to which Spengler connects
nature/culture), and which leads to bis description of the movement within world history from
culture to civilization, or from organic to inorganic relations. In the life-cycle of the West, this
shift occurs in the late summer of western history with the advent of Descartes, Pascal, Newton
and Leibniz; from that point on, it has been downhill all the way into nineteenth century
skepticism, materialism, intellectualism and abstraction.9 Geo-politicaUy, the shift from
organic to inorganic relations is marked by the predominance of the world-city over the
province, and it is fulfilled finally in imperialism: "Imperialism is Civilization unadulterated,"
says Spengler (36). The figure who embodies imperialism, "the first man of a new age," is
Cecil Rhodes: "The expansive tendency is a doom, something daemonic and immense, which
grips, forces into service, and uses up the late mankind of the world-city stage, willy-nilly,
aware or unaware" (37). It may be that the distinctions between being and becoming, and
organic and inorganic relations, have even by the late nineteenth century become a convenient
set of tropes enabling Spengler to define this movement towards sterility in imperialism, and
that Coetzee is simply discovering a contemporary application for them as well. However we
define Coetzee's use of them and his relation to Spengler, one recalls, in this sense of bloodless
and technical colonial power. Dawn's strategies against the Vieteong, Jacobus Coetzee's
against the Nama, and even Magda's sense of exclusion in In the Heart of lite Country from the
imagined fireside stories of Klein-Anna and by contrast, her own blasts of arid philosophy.
There are lingering traces of it, too, in the magistrate's subjection to Joll in Waiting for the
Barbarians, and in a purified form, in Michael K's gardening and his desire to keep out of all
the camps. But Dawn expresses it most clearly, as both a biographical fact and a political
compulsion:
When I was a boy making my quiet way through the years of grade school I
kept a crystal garden in my room: lances and fronds, ochre and ultramarine,
erected themselves frailly from the bottom of a preserve-jar, stalagmites obeying
their dead crystal life-force. Crystal seeds will grow for me. The other kind do
not sprout, even in California. (32)
But has the master-myth of history not outdated the fiction of the symbiosis of
earth and heaven? . . . In the Indo-China Theater we play out the drama of the
end of the tellurian age and the marriage of the sky-god with his parthenogene
daughter-queen. If the play has been poor, it is because we have stumbled about
the stage asleep, not knowing the meaning of our acts. Now I bring their meaning
to light in that blinding moment of ascending meta-historical consciousness in
which we begin to shape our own myths. (28)
In addition to historicisation, the other method employed in the attack on rationality is the
laying bare of the narrator's subject-position. This is achieved initially through parody, with
effects that take in some of the scientific discourses that have evolved in the wake of the
Enlightenment; these discourses, in one way or another concerned with enlarging empirical
knowledge, are the principal means whereby the narrators attempt, on behalf of their cultures,
to manage their world and achieve self-affirmation and mastery. The narrative tools evolving in
post-Beckenian metafiction were to hand in this aspect of Coetzee's work; the example of
Vladimir Nabokov's Pale Fire is particularly relevant, with its combination of text and
commentary in a single work. In Dusklands, this method is extended to a proliferation of tents
and counter-texts, which enables Coetzee to hold up various discourses for objecuficaticm.10
"Mythography" is the first of the discourses held up in this way; it is also the most difficult
to account for, for if the term is not a neologism, it is a specialism being given new emphases.
The obscurity is deliberate: "Mythography," says Dawn,"... is an open field like philosophy
or criticism because it has not yet found a methodology to lose itself in the mazes of. When
McGraw-Hill brings out the first textbook of mythography, I will move on" (33). The passage
goes on to develop a direct analogy between m ythography and exploration, with the implication
that what Dawn undertakes as a contemporary intellectual and revisionist enterprise, is a later
and only more abstract version of what Jacobus Coetzee undertakes in the interior. As the
inscription or re-inscription of myth—perhaps on myth—mythography takes the notion that
cultures gravitate around myths, and that individuals think the myths that cultures offer them,
and raises it to a higher power, thus making it productive and analytical and therefore useful, in
the projection of meta-critital, meta-analytical strengths. That mythography is able to reflect on
itself does not make it less politically embroiled; far from it, for its reflective character is a
means whereby, through self-consciousness, and through reflection on the conditions
underlying myths, more complete control is established. The notion of a mythography
objectifies and politicises, in fact, the idea of paradigm shift which was becoming increasingly
current at the time, locating it within the imperialist effort in Vietnam. It also holds out the
possibility that the analysis of myth along structural-functionalist lines, for example, can serve
the colonizer's ends, as did its predecessors in classical anthropology. For this reason, Franz
Boas is mentioned specifically as being part of the myihograpner's heritage (21). Coctzcc's
affinity with structuralism does not therefore exclude him from recognising that it can be used
to project the authority of a dominating culture. In "The Narrative of Jacobus Coetzee," other
discourses come into focus. Exploratory narrative, colonial adventure writing, landscape and
manners-and-customs description, and frontier or pioneer history, all deepen and localise the
critique, revealing more precisely the legacy of key colonial discourses in the management of
Southern Africa,
In both narratives of Dusldands, however, the objectificau'on of epistemic conditions, rooted
in language, is handled very specifically, that is, not only does it place certain discourses in
question in general terms, it also works by means of an explicit parody of a particular text or
group of texts, and a critical reconstruction of the situation in which these texts were originally
produced.
PARODY: THE AMERICAN CONTEXT
In "The Vietnam Report," the parodied documents appear to be taken from a series of studies
on "national security and international order" put together by a corporation called the Hudson
Institute which published a volume entitled Can We Win in Vietnam?: The American Dilemma.
Other texts might have been used as well, but this one is clearly one of. if not the, most
important The book was completed in the aftermath of the Tet offensive in February 1968.
when the Vietcong inflicted severe damage on South Vietnamese and American installations,
fuelling domestic anxiety in the U, S. about the feasibility of pursuing the war. There are five
contributors to the volume, three who are in favour of stepping up operations, and two who
think that (he U. S. should cut its losses and get out. One of the first group is Herman Kahn,
whose Introduction provides Coetzee with his epigraph:
Obviously it is difficult not to sympathise with those European and American
audiences who, when shown films of fighter-bomber pilots visibly exhilirated by
successful napalm bombing runs on Vtet-Cong targets, react with horror and
disgust. Yet, it is unreasonable to expect the U. S. Govemmment to obtain pilots
who are so appalled by the damage ihey may be doing that they cannot carry out
their missions or become excessively depressed or guilt-ridden. (Annbruster 10)
"Unreasonable" is the key word here, illustrating the spirit of cool, technological equanimity
that Eugene Dawn aims for in his report, ultimately unsuccessfully; Kahn is successful,
discussing at some length, for example, the "instrumental" position of tying the moral issues
with the question of whether the war is actually winnable (20*). The rhetorical context in "(iie
Vietnam Report" relies on the situation exemplified by (he Hudson documents: Dawn is a
"backroom boy" himself, who like several of the Hudson strategists, offers a program for
improving the effectiveness of the American presence. The intended readership of Dawn's
Report is the Department of Defense; clearly, !hat is where the Hudson Institute (and no doubt
other corporations, notably Rand) would like to have some influence. In several matters of
substance, moreover, the debates being conducted in the Hudson Institute prepare ihe way for
J. M. Coetzee. There is much discussion in Can We Win in Vietnam? of cultural factors as
potentially decisive in determining the war's outcome. The more forthright of the critics of U.
S. policy, Edmund StiUman, for example, puts the case as follows:
Vietnam is a land of strange and violent sects—e.g., Cao Dai and Hoa Hao,
"religions" that are also armed movements, and such "criminal sects" like the Binh
Xuyen, Mafias wi£h religious overtones. All unwittingly, America has stumbled
into a strange and convulsed society—and one that makes a mockery of the
traditional American world view, still faithfid to its eighteenth-century
Enlightenment origins and its nineteenth-century belief in the ability of material
wealth to calm any disorder of the spirit (156)
I shall ignore an abomination like "all unwittingly," and highlight the emphasis on cultural
difference. In a panel discussion at the end Df the volume, it is again the mythic imperviousness
of Vietnamese society that prompts much of the insecurity about policy and strategy (347-
349) . ! ! Coetzee unravels this apprehension—revealing the Euro-American "disorder of the
spirit" that Stilhnan claims is under control—in Cartesian, Hegelian and Sartrean terms, thus
giving it content and a philosophical and critical explanation. Rounding off the argument for
withdrawal, Stilhnan quotes Santayana in vocabulary directly applicable to Dawn: "A fanatic is
one who, having lost sight of his object, redoubles his zeal" (164). Kahn, in opposing critics
like Slillman, notes that as the resistance of the Vietcong to programs such as "attrition-
pressure-ouch" become tougher, the U. S. turns increasingly to what is called "pacification" or
"nation-building" (an attempt to strengthen traditional culture in order to prevent communist
infiltration), and argues in favour of seeing the problem in Vietnam as purely technical, and as
one of having a "theory of victory" (204-112). As Dawn puts it: "There is only one problem in
Vietnam and that is the problem of victory. The problem of victory is technical. We must
believe this. Victory is a matter of sufficient force, and we dispose of sufficient force" (29).
Let me pass over more incidental connections12 and deal with the remaining important ones.
There are occasions when the advocates of military solutions come close to the threshold of
moral discretion. For example, Kahn: "There may be in this kind of war vital special
operations that dD not meet these [Geneva Convention] criteria. If so, I would recommend,
first, that they be isolated from regular military operations, and secondly, that they be
rigorously reviewed and controlled at some reasonably high level" (319-320). Gastil, in an
appendix providing a plan for a revised "defense system" for areas controlled by the Vietcong,
suggests that the locals should be individually placed in categories ranging from those to be
tried for specific crimes (involving "punishment up to execution'') to "persons permitted to live
normally and take pan in politics." Then he adds: "It might well be found just, and certainly
expedient, to place present VC cadres in all categories, with most of the people in the last"
(416). The acknowledgement of expedience here amounts to an acceptance of the strategic
value of terror. The reason Dawn is disgraced at the Kennedy Institute is that he breaks this
threshold repeatedly and explicitly. On one occasion, in parenthesis, he repeats Gastil's
implication exactly: "SzeU reports that a camp authority which randomly and at random times
selects subjects for punishment, while maintaining the appearance of selectivity, is consistently
successful in breaking down group morale" (25). More generally, his advocacy of a program
of assassination and of area bombing transgress the boundary separating tacit from explicit, and
he argues, "There is an unsettling lack of realism about terrorism among the higher ranks of the
military. Questions of conscience lie outside the purview of this study. We must work on the
assumption that the military believe in their own explanations when they assign a solely military
value to terror operations" (23). Or again: "Until we reveal to ourselves and revel in the true
meaning of our acts we will go on suffering the double penalty of guilt and ineffectualness"
(31).
The possibility of a mythographic strategy is also an extension of the following kind of
observation, made by Kahn in a chapter entitled 'Toward a Program for Victory":
The problem is not to convert the average Vietnamese to our own image, but to
work with (he materials at hand. This, of course, may mean attempting to fulfill
certain aspirations for modernism that many Vietnamese have, but at the same
time adapting our programs and policies to the existential situation—particularly
the fact that most of our supporters are "peoples of the past" and not a
superpoliticized, modem totalitarian movement such as the NLF [National
Liberation Front]. (341)
Dawn's developing science is able to make specific proposals in this direction. An interesting
and difficult problem here relates to the fact that there was much debate in the U. S.—reflected
in the Hudson papers—about whether the dominant ideology in Vietcong insurgency was
communist or nationalist. The cold war thinking of the State Department under Kennedy clearly
regarded the insurgency as primarily communist, hence the commitment of troops; many critics
of foreign policy, however, regarded the NLF as nationalist. Not all of those favouring the
nationalist argument advocated withdrawal, however, as Kahn's position illustrates. Such is
Dawn's perspective as well, but it is curious that in Coetzee's reconstruction of Vietnamese
myth, via Dawn's report, there is nominal reference to the Marxist-Leninism of the NLF,
whose clarity, indeed, formulaic rigidity, is more than exemplified in a volume such as Ho Chi
Minn's Selected Writings. Instead, the report gives precedence to the myth of the father and me
rebellion of the band of brothers. The myth owes much more to Totem and Taboo than to any
more plausible anthropological description of either Vietcong or South Vietnamese traditions,
which when not influenced by Marxist-Leninism, were quite heterogenous (involving, in
addition to a number of smaller sects, a range from Catholic—following French colonialism—
to Chinese Buddhist). It is to Coetzee's political credit that he does not, in a novel such as this,
attempt what would in ordinary posilivist language be called a faithful representation of
Vietnamese myth. The question then becomes, what is Freud doing in this description?
Its purpose would appear to be to reinforce the evolutionist imperative behind the notion of a
mythography. Freud's account of the primal horde in Totem and Taboo was intended as a
universally applicable explanation of, among other things, the incest taboo. Kahn's expression,
"the people of the past," qualified as it is by quotation, acknowledges a cultural-descriptive
heritage in which Freud is a prominent figure. The myth of Uie rebellion of the brothers is
especially useful because it provides the U. S. with the role of father, and therefore strengthens
the philosophical implication of dominance—hence Dawn's proposals concerning the use of the
father-voice in the programming of propaganda. When Dawn realises, however, that adopting
the position of father might reinforce the myth of rebellion and therefore be self-defeating (26-
27), he turns to another myth in Western evolutionist thought, namely, the Hegelian "master-
myth of history," or "that blinding moment of ascending mew-historical consciousness in which
we begin to shape our own myths" (28). The appeal which immediately follows, for recourse
to the goddess techne, who "springs from our brains," connects this Hegelian self-
consciousness with earlier references to the moment of Western scientific rationality, as well as
suggesting that in latter-day imperialism, technology will resolve by force what cannot be
resolved by other means, such as withdrawal.
PARODY: THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT
Dawn's counterpart in the second part of Dusklands is the editor and historian, S. I.
Coetzee. Their connection lies in their respective commitment to a discourse of scientific
objectivity in the service of the historical ascendancy of their own culture. Dawn's
mythography is matched by S. J. Coetzee's pioneer history.13 Significantly, the dates given
for the fictitious course of lectures given by S. I. Coetzee at the University of Stellenbosch,
from which the Afterword is drawn, precisely mark the period of the rise of the formal political
power of Afrikaner nationalism under D. F. Malan, from the break with the Smuts-Hertzog
Fusion government in 1934, to final electoral victory in 1948. As editor of Jacobus Coetzee's
narrative and its official historian, S. I. Coetzee's role in the reproduction and management of
historical data places him at the centre of the second half of Dusklands. J. M. Coetzee, as
"translator," is S. J. Coetzee's antagonist, for it quickly emerges that J. M. Coetzee
subversively re-produces and re-manages the work of S. J. Coetzee, both by dropping
intertextual ironies and by actively rewriting the historical documents themselves, thus breaking
explicitly the conventionally neutral stance of translator—and going well beyond the familiar
acknowledgement that translation is already a kind of leinscription.
It is here that we must locate the relevance of the epigraph to "The Narrative of Jacobus
Coetzee," taken from Flaubert "What is important is the philosophy if history." It comes from
a point in Bouvard et P(cachet when, having discovered the relatively arbitrary status of dates,
the protagonists question the relevance of facts in general, which in rum provides the
momentary certainty of "Ce qu'il y a d'important, c'est la philosophie de l'Histoire!" (190).
Very soon, however, even this is discarded for other opinions, in Flaubert's parody. Its place
in Coetzee's scheme, however, is simply to emphasize the fickleness of data, and to direct
attention to the struggle over history, to the writing of history or to historiography, for it is in
the latter domain that a "philosophy" or meta-historical conception of what constitutes inner
historical law or destiny has force. It is interesting that Coetzee should have returned to
Bouvard et Piatchel as an early example of fiction's capacity to subsume scientific discourses
under its own projects; his more modest subversion of the archive of the Van Riebeeck Society
has, as one of its points of origin, Flaubert's subversion of the scientific documents of the
Enlightenment, especially the encyclopaedia.
The source of J. M Coetzee's parodic version of pioneer history is probably an essay by
one N. A. Coetzee, who in 1958 published in the journal Historia an essay entitled "Jacobus
Coetzee: Die Boerepionier van Groot-Namakwaland."M Where S. J. Coetzee is defensive and
less than ingenuous in the hands of I. M. Coetzee, N. A. Coetzee is forthright in his treatment
of the ancestral frontiersman: "Jacobus Coetzee was een van die merfcwardigstc persoonlikhede
in cms pioniersgeskiedenis" (588) ("one of the most noteworthy figures in our pioneer
history"]. N. A. Coetzee also drops phrases like die binneland oop te maak ("to open the
interior"), die voorposte van die beskawing ("the outposts of civilisation"), die wye onbekcndc
van 'n tie vadertandsbodem {"the wide unknown of one's own native soil"—a splendid
oxymoron) quite unself-consciously (593). Most pertinently, N. A. Coetzee argues that
Jacobus Coetzee was resourceful in finding ways of exercising his "gcsag as blanke . . . in 'o
see van barbare" ("his authority as a white person in a sea of barbarians") when he approached
the Great Namaquas. 15 This involved keeping out of the Namaqua camp, deferring to the
authority of the Governor, and preserving the force of his personality in negotiating for safe
passage in the local language (59S). This version of the encounter, in relation to the experience
of other explorers in the region, notably Brink and Wikar, is arypically confrontational, but it is
nevertheless N. A. Coetzee's account (spinning out a few clues in Jacobus Coetzee's original
deposition) that endures in the more elaborated version in Duskiands itself (69-73). This
suggests that J. M. Coetzee's use of sources is directly related to his critical intentions with
respect to the preceding generation, S. J. Coetzee being the fictional father.
This begs the question of exactly how free J. M. Coetzee is in his use of the sources. It has
generally been assumed since Peter Knox-Shaw's discussion of this question in Contrast that
the deposition or Reiaas of Jacobus Coetzee, reproduced as an Appendix, is the one authentic
historical document in Duskiands, and that the remaining sections are either fictitious or
deliberately corrupted ("A Metaphysics of Violence" 27). This is inaccurate, however, in the
sense that Coetzee tampers substantially with the deposition as well. Apart from minor but
consistent alterations in dates and figures, Coetzee significantly omits from and adds to the
document. Omitted (among other details which disturb narrative coherence) are references to
the friendly disposition of the Namaquas; the fact that Jacobus Coetzee was allowed to pass:
that there was an Exchange of gifts—oxen for links from his trek-chain (Reiaas 285); also, that
he returned with a Great Namaqua who wished to get to the Cape (289)! Needless to say, N.
A. Coetzee omits most of these details as well, since (hey detract from the confrontational
emphasis which strengthens the frontier hypothesis of white nationalism. Perhaps more
staitlingly, added to the deposition are two accounts of desertion. The first involves an "Envoy
of the Damroquas [who] had not long ago met a treacherous end at the hands of servants
afflicted for lack of pursuits with the Black Melancholy; that these servants had fled to the
Namaquas he the narrator had first met and dwelt yet among them; wherefore he should treat
warily with the lastmentioned and look always to his Person" {Duskiands 132). (Laziness is a
common accusation of the ethnographers of the period, discussed in some detail in White
Writing [12 -35]; here Coetzee turns it into a Renaissance joke.) The second instance of
desertion affects Jacobus Coetzee himself: "being on his return journey deserted by his
servants but not being disturbed by the aforementioned Namaquas..." (133).
Coetzee therefore omits cordial exchanges from the record, and adds desertion. The
immediate purpose would seem to be consistency: Jacobus Coetzee's first-person narrative also
includes an episode of desertion. The deeper and more salient purpose, however, is that it
radically turns the narrative into a game of power, emphasizing the movement of the colonizer-
self from assertion, to sharp encounter, followed by weakness and debilitation, attempts at self-
preservation (at this point, desertion by servants), followed by recovery and reconstitution of
the self, and finally, re-assertion (by meting out punishment). The analysis that follows shortly
10
will track this movement through its three main phases. (I shall also make connections to
Dawn's narrative as I proceed.)
The game of power would explain another, equally spectacular alteration. The Hop
expedition, originally, was a fact-finding mission prompted by Coetzee's Relaas to investigate
the economic propects in the territory and to locate if possible a people (the Herein) who "are
tawny in appearance, with long hair on their heads and are clad in linen, and who it must be
supposed are a civilised People" (Brink S). J. M. Coetzee ignores the original purpose
(although he uses details from this expedition in constructing Jacobus Coetzee's narrative),
making it a punitive raid on the servants who have now taken up with the Namaquas. The
problem of desertion runs prominently through the early documents on colonial justice under
the administration of the Dutch East India Company, as is exemplified again and again in
Moodie's The Record, but in le-wriu'ng the narrative of the Hop expedition Coetzee seems to
have picked up two specific incidents in the actual events of the Coetzee/Hop journeys and
conflated them: one involving a murder, and the other involving ordinary theft, accompanied
by seemingly gratuitous violence. The murder took place during the return journey of the Hop
expedition, when a servant named Ruyter was killed by a certain Coenraad Scheffer (in the
novel, "Scheffer" rivals only Jacobus Coetzee in sadism). Ruyter refused an order to fetch
water, a struggle developed in which he was stabbed; later the same night, Scheffer shot him
while everyone was asleep. The official narrative of the expedition was later amended to
conceal the murder from the Chamber of Seventeen in Holland (Brink vii, 115). The second
incident concerns an illegal trading expedition (twenty-two years before Coetzee's) by a party of
burghers which was discovered by the authorities when, on the return journey, the Hottentot
servants, "with or without their masters' permission, returned armed, and robbed the Great
Namaquas, killing seven of them" (Brink 94). As in T h e Vietnam Report," J. M. Coetzee is
uncovering or rendering explicit what is relegated in the original documents to the borders of
legality. "But I have nothing to-be ashamed of," says Dawn, "I have merely told the truth"
(38). In "The Narrative of Jacobus Coetzee," the consequences of "telling the truth" are
fundamental to the structure of the narrative itself.
Knox-Shaw's complaint that the "fictional narrative is distinguished throughout by a virtual
effacement of economic motive" (28), a position that has held currency (it is repeated by Dovey
and Kohler), seems misplaced, in the light of what the revision of sources does achieve. But
the observation is incorrect, even on its own terms. The very opening paragraph of "The
Narrative of Jacobus Coetzee" deals with the social consequences of the shift in white
settlement from burgher to trekboer in the political economy of the eighteenth century,
consequences which involved a developing competitiveness between the Boers and both Khoi
and San over land and cattle. The story of Adam Wijnand, the son of a servant who left home
and established himself with "ten thousand head of cattle, as much land as he can patrol, a
stableful of women" (61), locates Jacobus Coetzee's bitterness immediately and precisely
within this social and material context. In fact, if, as Kohler argues ("Freeburghets" 24-25),
the background to the story of Adam Wijnand is the history of Adam Kok, then we must
deduce that it was precisely to contextualise Jacobus Coetzee in this way that I. M. Coetzee was
once again so deliberately cavalier with the historical record, for Coetzee would be omitting
Kok's political career in order to emphasise the contest over resources. Coetzee dispenses with
the data in order to arrive at deeper version of the truth. In addition to the contextualisation,
Jacobus Coetzee himself mentions the object of his journey, to find ivory, when negotiating
with the Great Namaquas (75)—Knox-Shaw claims this is removed from the narrative. It is
also inaccurate to say that J. M. Coetzee "virtually effaces" the economic basis for the entire
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colonial project, for, among other available examples, in S. J. Coetzee's Afterword we are told
of Jacobus Coetzee, on the banks of the Great River, dreaming "a father dream of rafts laden
with produce sailing down to the sea and the waiting schooners" (128). If one were to take this
question very seriously, one might go as far as to say that Coetzee's knowledge of colonial
economics is in fact more subtle than Knox-Shaw's, in the sense that the narrative, with a
sophistication unmatched in Knox-Shaw's strictures, implicitly plots Jacobus Coetzee's
economic options in terms of attempts to revive earlier practices in the colonial enterprise (a raid
on natural resources, followed by trade) in the face of the threat of impoverishment that the shift
from mercantile capitalism to settler pastoralism entails, in the world of Jacobus Coetzee.
THE QUEST FOR POWER: ASSERTION, PRESERVATION, RECOVERY
The truth, however, is that Coetzee's interests lie elsewhere, even though the economic
dimension is fully acknowledged. If Coetzee's emphases are different, then the point is to ask
why, rather than turn evaluative. "The one gulf that divides us from the Hottentots is our
Christianity. We are Christians, a folk with a destiny. . . . The Hottentot is locked into the
present. He does not care where he comes from or where he is going" (61-62). 16 This
categorical emphasis on racial and cultural difference is then enforced in subsequent
descriptions of commando raids against the Bushmen (62-66).17 The final paragraph in these
descriptions deals with the rape of Bushmen women, which Jacobus Coetzee represents as
offering an ideal of freedom, "the freedom of the abandoned": unlike the colonists' daughters
who connect the white male with "a system of property relationships," a "wild Bushman girl is
tied to nothing": "You have become Power itself now and she is nothing, a rag you wipe
yourself on and throw away" (65). This is what I shall call Jacobus Coetzee's early fiction of
self-assertion, a fiction involving the Hegelian attempt to extract self-consciousness, or self-
validation, from the recognition given by the other. Immediately hereafter, the narrative proper
begins (under the heading "Journey beyond the Great River"), with J. M. Coetzee putting
together from Brink's journal a cursory account of die journey northward, in order to get to the
encounter with the Great Namaquas as quickly as possible. In this encounter and what
follows, the fiction of self-assertion with which the preamble ends, is destroyed—and has to be
restored, in the final episode of the narrative, by Jacobus Coetzee at all costs.
In the initial moments of the encounter, Jacobus Coetzee sizes up the Namaqua leader and is
condescendingly pleased with his self-assurance and humanity, but J. M. Coetzee lingers here,
departing, in fact, from the narrative discourse used in the construction of the journey, in order
to delve more fully into the resonance of the moment by means, once again, of an explicit
parody:
Tranquilly I traced in my heart the forking paths of the endless inner adventure:
the order to follow, the inner debate (resist? submit?), underlings rolling their
eyeballs, words of moderation, calm, swift march, the hidden defile, the
encampment, the graybeard chieftain, the curious throng, words of greeting, firm
tones. Peace! Tobacco!,... the order to follow, the inner debate, the casual
spear in the vitals (Viscount d'Almeida), the fleeing underlings, pole through the
fundament, ritual dismemberment in the savage encampment,... the order to
follow, the inner debate, the cowardly blow, amnesia, the dark hut, bound hands,
uneasy sleep, dawn, the sacrificial gathering, the wizard, the contest of magic, the
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celestial almanac, darkness at noon, victory, an amusing but tedious reign as tribal
demi-god. return to civilization, with numerous entourage of cattle—these forking
paths across that true wilderness without polity called the land of the Great
Namaqua where everything, I was to find, was possible. (70-71)
Strands are woven together here from a range of sources in colonial adventure writing, from
documentary, such as the reference to the death of d'Almeida, (recounted in several early
histories) or to methods of impaling imputed to Shaka , to fiction, such as the wizard and the
contest of magic, and what follows, in King Solomon's Mines. Framing the whole, is the
Conradian emphasis on the journey inward, "the inner adventure," and on the disappearance of
known social conventions, with the suggestion thai the genre of colonial adventure writing
involves the projection of a subject into a narrative sequence whose purpose is to establish,
deepen, or possibly reconstitute, the subject's coherence and authority (though the "forking
paths" of the genre also mischievously suggest the equivocal nature of this enterprise).18
In several ways, the preamble to Eugene Dawn's Report contains similar attempts at self-
assertion, though in Dawn's case the equivocation is more dramatic. The account of the
relationship with Marilyn (like Marilyn Monroe, the name of conjugal bliss in the ironic
allegory of names in (he first part of Duskiands) is a catalogue of failures to achieve connection,
sexual and otherwise; the photographs which Dawn carries around in his briefcase, and
ferishises, involve attempts to get beyond trie surface of the picture to direct reciprocity: "Under
the persistent pressure of my imagination... it may yet yield" (17). The glint in the eye of the
prisoner in this particular photograph is immediately generalised to all the Vietcong, while
Dawn also speaks on behalf of his culture as a whole; "We brought them our pitiable selves,
trembling on the edge of inexistence, and asked only that they acknowledge us" (18).
American violence, imaged in the gun, in fire, in the knife, and finally in rape, is then projected
as a hysterical and futile attempt at self-validation in relation to the Vietcong (18)." Just as the
structure of Jacobus Coetzee's narrative undermines his self-assertive fiction, so Dawn's
attempts to contain and control his ontological insecurities in the rationalism of the Report go
awry: "I am in a bad way as I write these words. . . . But I see things and have a duty
toward history that cannot wait" (31).
Jacobus Coetzee is undermined early in the encounter with the Great Namaquas. In direct
contrast to N. A. Coetzee's representation of his rhetorical range in the local language, we find,
despite his best efforts, Jacobus Coetzee acknowledging ruefully; "The irony and moralism of
forensic oratory, uneasily translated into Nama, were quite alien to the Hottentot sensibility"
(75). The Namaquas are oblivious to his attempts to establish control. Things come to a head
when in the camp, he returns to his wagon to find the servants helpless while the locals pilfer
his goods; he lays about him with his whip, the people retreat, a woman comes forward to
taunt him, he fires into the ground at her feet, and scrambles out of the camp with his men and
oxen; later that night, fever sets in, and his servants return him to the camp to seek help, thus
subjecting Coetzee to a mild form of captivity. In captivity, Jacobus Coetzee develops in Ms
delirium a series of "meditations" which amount to what I shall call fictions of self-preservation.
While the fiction of self-assertion is conveyed partly in descriptions of genocide and rape, and
partly in a parodic version of the narrative of colonial adventure, the fictions of self-preservation
retreat into the prepositional discourse of ontology and metaphysics. Indeed, their type is the
by now familiar Hegelian dialectic, but whereas before, this dialectic was rendered in terms of
siruational conflict, here it is developed specifically, in metaphor, and in a language resembling
speculative philosophy. In addition to Hegel, however, these "meditations" also carry the
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imprint of both Descartes and Same, suggesting an attempt to place the whole of Western
metaphysics into the fragmented colonial space: Like Eugene Dawn, Jacobus Coetzee has
become Herakles roasting in the poisoned shin of heroic individualism (34).
The process of inner retreat is carefully presented, with Coetzee, in the care of his servants,
attempting to define himself in isolated potency: "A great peace descended upon me: the even
rocking of the wagon, the calm sun on the tent. I carried my secret buried within me. I could
not be touched. . . . I deepened myself in a boyhood memory of a hawk ascending the sky in a
funnel of hot air" (80). Coetzee now hears two voices, "one near, one far. 'Wash my feet,
bind my breast,' said the near voice, "will you promise not to sing?' Far away, from the remote
South, the second voice sang. The first voice responded interminably" (80). The voices
correspond to what S. J. Coetzee later will call "zones of destiny" (116), the near voice
representing the appeal of the interior, now modified as an impulse to relinquish assertion and
seek reconciliation; the far voice, the voice of the remote South, represents the voice of
settlement, civilisation, polity. Caught between these zones, both of which have in the past,
and will again, contain and explain him, Coetzee now must find new ways of achieving self-
consciousness as an integral being, plagued though he is by apprehensions of abandonment and
death. In this situation, J. M. Coetzee grants him the language of metaphysical speculation,
encoded in the life of "the tamer of the wild." All the meditations are inconclusive, and they are
ironised in the rhetorical context by being spoken to "Jan Klawer, Hottentot," with his "savage
birthright" (87).
The first of these meditations concerns the explorer's relationship with the landscape of the
interior, Projecting himself outward from his bed to "repossess [his] world," Coetzee
contemplates the "lures of interiors for rape," and realises that "under the explorer's
hammerblow this innocent interior transforms itself in a flash into a replete, confident worldly
image of [a] red or grey exterior." Not only do the promises of the interior begin to appear as
"fictions," but Coetzee has misgivings about his own "interior" being equally elusive: "My gut
would dazzle if I pierced myself. These thoughts disquieted me" (83).
The next meditation, on the subject of dreams, is similarly disconcerting. It attempts,
without conviction, to recover the cogito, in "a universe of which I the Dreamer was sole
inhabitant," but it ends by questioning this proposition as possibly a "little fable I had always
kept in reserve to solace myself with en lonely evenings, much as the traveller in the desert
keeps back his last few drops of water, choosing to die rather than die without choice" (83).
The fallowing sequence is on the subject of "boundaries," of ho w the explorer, in seemingly
limitless space and solitude, separates himself from his world. The primary defence against
solipsism is the gun; "The gun is our mediator with the world and therefore our saviour. The
tidings of (he gun: such-and-such is outside, have no fear. The gun saves us from the fear that
all life is within us" (84). The argument is clearly hollow and self-defeating, however, as
Dovey (92-93) has argued, because if otherness is eliminated by violence, there can be no
recognition of the subject. But it is not only the logic of the argument that is at fault, it is also
its ethics. The pervasive sense of calculation in Jacobus Coetzee's speculations must
undermine their prepositional status. The ethical force of these pages involves something like
the following: death, or rather, dead things, Coetzee's "dispersed pyramid to life," are the
explorer's salvation; moreover, colonial settlement itself is death, or a means of dispensing it;
"The essence of orchard tree and farm sheep is number. Our commerce with the wild is a
tireless enterprise of turning it into orchard and farm He who does not understand number
does not understand death" (35). J. M. Coetzee is offering here a direct reversal of a particular
trope in colonial discourse, where the value usually placed on such work as enumeration (more
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classically, naming and classification, but the underlying principle is the same) is typically
Adaraic; in Jacobus Coetzee, however, instead of being creative, the transformations are sterile
and destructive. One is reminded of the passage taken from Ovid in the epigraph to White
Writing: "Pressing his lips to foreign soil, greeting the unfamiliar mountains and plains,
Cadmus gave thanks. . . . Descending from above, Pallas told him how to plow and sow the
earth with the serpent's teeth, which would grow into a future nation" (Metamorphoses 3;
Coetzee's translation).
When Jacobus Coetzee speaks in the next meditative sequence of the approach of the master
and savage across space, it is true that Hegel is being reformulated in terms close to the original
(Dovey 94); however, there are distinctions that must be made. In Coetzee, we do not have
master and slave, but master and savage. The other, prior to his appearance as slave, is
radically other, with cultural difference inscribed in that otherness, so that his approach involves
the establishment of a threshold near to which the explorer feels a genuine vulnerability, where
the "out there . . . promises to enfold, ingest, and project me through itself as a speck on a
field which we may call annihilation or alternatively history" (86). It is this threshold that
presents itself to the explorer as "an ideal form of the life of penetration" (86), If the savage
crosses the "annulus" of space defined by the two presences, entering the master's space, he
becomes slave, the Hegelian "inessential consciousness"; however, it is more frequently the
explorer's experience that there is no crossing of this limit, and no resolving climax: there is an
obligatory exchange of gifts, directions, warnings, demonstrations of firearms, followed by an
enigmatic pursuit of the explorer, at first devious, then frank, but never close, producing "the
obscure movement of the soul (weariness, relief, incuriosity, terror)" that is felt as "a fated
pattern and a condition of life" (86-87). Suspension, irresolution, anxiety: such is the
explorer's historical lot One must also qualify the repeated reference to Hegel, however, for in
Sartre's discussion of the Look, the transcription of Hegel is figured precisely in terms of
space, of the distances between objects, and of the disruption of the perceptual field'of the
subject by the entry of the other (Being and Nothingness 254-257).
We have come a long way from the crisply efficient prose of S. J. Coetzee. A broken and
historicised subjectivity, put together from the tradition of Western metaphysics, has intruded
and subverted the record, even before S. J. Coetzee's version of events is presented.20 The
narrowing of the distance between the subject and an ostensibly neutral scientific discourse is
effected more directly in "The Vietnam Project," where Dawn breaks off the bureaucratic
register, saying, "We are all somebody's sons. Do not think it does not pain me to make this
report" (28). In pointed reference to the sense of contradiction, he later adds that he is speaking
"to the broken halves of all our selves," telling them "to embrace, loving the worst in us equally
with the best" (31). The shadowy supervisor, the "Coetzee" to whom this is addressed as a
"postscript," remains a silent and steely reminder of the scientism from which Dawn has
lapsed.21
The meditations over. Jacobus Coetzee steadily "recovers." There are two prominent
features of the narrative around which this recovery revolves: the rebellion of the servants,
notably Plaatje, and the carbuncle. This is surely among the most portentous of carbuncles in
any literature. The rebellion leads to desertion, the final and decisive challenge to Coetzee's
authority. In order to rectify matters at the existential level, Coetzee needs to reconstitute
himself in self-consciousness. The carbuncle is really a blessing, for the infliction of pain
serves this purpose. As he milks his wound, lovingly scrutinising its products, he is really
recovering a sense of the body and the self, as object The theme is taken up in a later moment
of narcissistic reverie:
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Around my forearms and neck were rings of demarcation between the rough red-
brown skin of myself the invader of the wilderness and slayer of elephants and
myself the Hottentot's patient victim. I hugged my white shoulder, 1 stroked my
white buttocks, I longed for a mirror. Perhaps I would find a pool, a small limpid
pool with a dark bed, in which I might stand and, framed by the recomposing
clouds, see myself as others had seen me, making out at last too the lump my
fingers had told me so much about, the scar of violence I had done myself.
(103)22
This reading is consistent with the drift of the remaining pages of Jacobus Coetzee's
narrative, where during the return journey his primary concern, in what may be called fictions
of self-recovery, is to achieve absolute self-sufficiency; of course, such a condition is quite
fictitious, and Jacobus Coetzee is perhaps at his most specious here. After being banished for
biting off the ear of a child who taunted him, he turns necessity into a virtue by treating the loss
of his wagon, weapons, accoutrements and servants, as a "casting off [of] attachments" (99).
The death of Klawer occurs at this point,23 after which Coetzee "feels free to initiate [himself]
into the desert": "Every possible copula was enacted that could link the world to an elephant
hunter armed with a bow and crazed with freedom after seventy days of watching eyes and
listening ears" (101). Dovey points out how contradictory Coetzee's efforts to achieve
complete ontological independence are in this sequence. His attempt to perform the "ur-act"
ends in impotence; his calling to God to witness his aloneness shows his dependence on an
imagined consciousness for self-recognition; and his ditty, "Hottentot, Hottentot./! am not a
Hottentot" precisely traps him in a relational position from which he is trying to escape (Dovey
107-108). The sentence following the ditty is interesting, however "It was neater in Dutch
than in Nama, which still lived in the flowering-time of inflexion" (101). Unaware of his non-
sequitur, Coetzee values the clean opposition carried in the inflexion in Dutch, the colonial
language—an historical nuance residually derived, perhaps, from the Whorfian principle that
particular languages have distinctive epistemic consequences.
Jacobus Coetzee's sojourn in the land of the Great Namaquas undercuts his early self-
affirming fiction; indeed, frustration, self-division and fragmentation plague him, even in his
most apparently euphoric moments. Since his experience is so much in polarities, he invents a
hypothesis to contradict the dominant trend, in characteristic bad faith. This is the story of what
he calls the "Zero beetle," which has the gift of seeming infinitely resistant ID all attacks:
What passes through his mind during the last moments? Perhaps he has no mind,
perhaps his mind is extraverted as mere behaviour, as they say of the praying
mantis (hotnotsgod). Nevertheless, in a formal sense he is a true creature of
Zeno. "Now [ am only half-way dead. Now I am only three-fourths dead. Now
I am only seven-eighths dead. The secret of my life regresses infinitely before
your probing finger. You and I could spend eternity splitting fractions. If I keep
still long enough you will go away, Now I am only fifteen-sixteenths dead.
(102)
As a follower of Parmenides, Zeno held that Being was undivided; that the category "not-is" is
unknowable; that both motion and plurality do not exist (distance is never erased, only reduced
in ever-diminishing fractions, and whatever is plural, can be numbered). Comforting himself
with Zenonian principles—thus forcing what has been a story of fragmentation into a private
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myth of wholeness and integrity—Coetzee claims that he had hidden himself away in the
"labyrinth" of the self, that the "Hottentot assault" had been "baffled from the beginning, in a
body which partook too of the labyrinth, by the continuity of my exterior with the interior
surface of my digestive tract." Whereas in his earlier meditations he had found the
demystification of inferiority disquieting, here he derives comfort from it (since the positions of
subject and object have been imaginatively reversed), showing once again how much of a
philosophical opportunist he really is. Once again, however, X. M. Coetzee makes use of an
ironic reversal of colonial tropes. If the Hottentots had been "true savages," he might have had
a more satisfying encounter with them, Coetzee decides. Defining "true savagery" as "a way of
life based on disdain for the value of human life and sensual delight in the pain of others" (104),
Jacobus Coetzee—as Knox-Shaw accurately shows (31)—exemplifies precisely these attributes
himself in the remaining events of the narrative. Entering the periphery of colonial property, he
attacks a herd of cattle and wounds the herder; on arrival at his own farm, he falls on a lamb
like "God in a whirlwind" and enters his house with the liver (106). Although the full extent of
Jacobus Coetzee's sadism is revealed only in the Hop expedition, what has been established in
the contractive irony of these closing paragraphs is that the critique of Jacobus Coetzee's
oncological recovery carries a socialised, ethical weight
The Hop expedition demonstrates this with horrifying clarity, Its purpose is nothing less
than to stage, theatrically, the drive towards self-consciousness on the part of the seemingly
reconstituted, penetrative, male, assertive self, in the form of a punitive raid on the deserted
servants. Apart from its violence (which I shall discuss shortly) the most prominent feature of
the passage is that it presents Jacobus Coetzee observing himself perform these acts of sadism.
The opening paragraph is explicitly conventional, beginning "We descended on their camp at
dawn, the hour recommended by the classic writers on warfare, haloed in red sky-streaks that
portended a blustery afternoon," and ending, "Fill in the morning smoke rising straight in the
air, the first flies makingfor the corpse, and you have the tableau" (107). For the rest, the
passage is marked by stiffened formality, by a repetitive, declamatory "I," and by frequent, self-
regarding commentary: "A muscle worked in my jaw," says Coetzee, comforting a dying
Plaatje whom he has just shot (113). It is violence theatrically ritualised in self-consciousness.
The corresponding attempt to regain self-conscious potency, after it has broken down, in
"The Vietnam Project," is the motel sequence, in which Dawn runs off with his son, Martin. •
Writing in the "present definite," Dawn in several ways muses over the possibility of finding a
language in which the referent is not problemattsed, the desired referent being himself, that is,
projected into a stable world of immanent and verifiable things. Dawn speaks appreciatively of
names, especially of songbirds, plants and insects, which seem to have fullness and self-
sufficiency. This offers an alternative to the relational principle of meaning, the legacy of
contemporary linguistics: "Like so many people of an intellectual cast, I am a specialist in
relations rather than names. . . . Perhaps I should have been an entomologist" (37-38).
Shortly hereafter, similar questions are raised about novelistic discourse. "I have Herzog and
Voss, two reputable books, at my elbow, and I spend many analytic hours puzzling out the
tricks which their authors perform to give their monologues . . . the air of the real world
through the looking-glass" (38). The books are well chosen, for together, they place in
question the status of the project of the contemporary biidungsroman in the colonies, but the
immediate point has to do with realism, and the stable, authentic self that is historically linked
with the realist tradition. This is the mode that Dawn would tike to inhabit It needs to said, of
course, that the very archness of his calculations effectively excludes him from doing so, and
the attempted self-recovery's inevitably a failure. Dawn's "true ideal," he tells us, rather like
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Jacobus Coetzee's Zenonian myth, "is of an endless discourse of character, the self reading the
self to the self in all infinity." There is more at stake here, however, than a gently ironic
reflection on a generic discourse: would a life of action, he asks, have saved him from self-
division? The reply to this can only be negative, for action takes consciousness into the world.
and it is there that the divisions are generated. Dawn's response is "to call down death upon
death upon the men of action":
Since February of 1965 their war has been living its life at my expense. I know
and 1 know and I know what it is that has eaten away my manhood from inside,
devoured the food that should have nourished me. It is a thing, a child not mine,
once a baby squat and yellow whelmed in the dead center of my body, sucking
my blood, growing by my waste, now, 1973, a hideous mongot boy who
stretches his limbs inside my hollow bones, gnaws my liver with his smiling
teeth, voids his bilious filth into my systems, and will not go. I want an end to it!
I want my deliverance! (40)
The passage prepares for the savage act which follows—recounted now in the "present in
definite" (my emphasis)—Dawn's stabbing of his son. There is a metonymic chain here which
helps to explain this act. Self-division is imaged early on in terms of the rebellion of the body.
The capaciousness of flesh, undermining the cogito , is a theme with Beckettian overtones
(Molloy 66-67). Here, Dawn is inhabited by a mongol child, a specifically ambiguous symbol,
suggesting not only the rebellious body in the form of a capricious congenital inheritance, but
also the other of South-east Asia, growing precisely in relation to the level of commitment of
American troops, 1965-1973. The body, in other words, situates the self and self-
consciousness in history. (A similar doubleness in the image of a child occurs when Jacobus
Coetzee is recovering from fever in his hut: "Patches of skin had peeled from its face, hands,
and legs, revealing a pink inner self in poor imitation of European colouring. . . . 1 told it it
was a dream and ordered it not to touch m e . . . " [88-89].) The body—the child-parasite—the
historical other it is this chain, I suggest, that Dawn tries to halt and destroy in stabbing the
son, Martin; for the chain destroys the coherence of the transcendent self. (What Dawn does
not want, furthermore, just as he does not need the men of action, is the regenerative historical
continuity of children.) The violence of the act has its direct structural parallel in the violence of
the Hop expedition in "The Narrative of Jacobus Coetzee"—about which there is more to be
said at this point
The violence of the Hop expedition is so startling as to become a burden for most readers.
For this reason, Knox-Shaw, for example, on traditional humanist grounds, indicts J. M.
Coetzee for merely re-enacting "true savagery" and therefore furthering its claims (33). In
response to this argument, Dovey correctly points out that Coetzee is refusing the option of a
neutralising discourse, but then she herself, goes on to discuss the episode in relation to
pornography which, in various guises, tries to return to "a fullness of speech and thereby to a
fullness of being" (115): the violence is therefore another moment in the allegory of the
narrator's failure to achieve self-realisation. This reading still begs the question of why violence
is used to achieve these ends, so that Dovey's metacriu'cal reading is simply another form of
neutralisation. There is no question that the episode is projected explicitly as violence, this is so
much the case that not to cite a relevant passage would surely be evasive:
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"Stand up," I said. "I am not playing, 111 shoot you right here." I held the muzzle
of my gun against his forehead. "Stand up!" His face was quite empty. As I
pressed the trigger he jerked his head and the shot missed. Scheffer was smoking
his pipe and smiling. I blushed immoderately. I put my foot on Adonis's chest to
hold htm and reloaded. "Please, master, please," he said, "my aim is sore." I
pushed the muzzle against his lips. "Take it," I said. He would not take it. I
stamped. His lips seeped blood, his jaw relaxed. I pushed the muzzle in till he
began to gag. I held his head steady between my ankles. Behind me his sphincter
gave way and a rich stench tilled the air. "Watch your manners, hotnot," I said. I
regretted this vulgarity. The shot sounded as minor as a shot fired into the sand.
Whatever happened in the pap inside his head left his eyes crossed. Scheffer
inspected and laughed. I wished Scheffer away. ( I l l )
The depravity of the scene, deeply exacerbated by Jacobus Coetzee's self-observation, not to
mention his sick humor and hypocritical scorn for Scheffer, is surely transgressive, not in a
theoretical manner which enables one to explain it, but rather, in an aggressive mode that is
aimed ultimately at extant conventions of reading. The formal explanation (what Jacobus
Coetzee impatiently calls "expiation explanation palinode") for these acts is given directly, and it
is predictable: Through their deaths I, who after they had expelled me had wandered the desert
like a pallid symbol, again asserted my reality," and "I have taken it upon myself to be the one
to pull the trigger, performing this sacrifice for myself and my countrymen, who exist, and
committing upon the dark folk the murders we have all wished. . . . I am a tool in the hands of
history" (113-114). A further reason, given by Jacobus Coetzee himself, specifically in
explanation of his bitterness, is the "desolate infinity" of his power undergoing "a failure of
imagination before the void." he feels "sick at heart" (108-109). Neither of these explanations,
however, is sufficient to account for the aggressivity of the prose.
I argue that the violence of the passage, and others like it, cannot satisfactorily be explained,
for the aggiessivity remains a social fact that readers have and will continue to give witness to.
This argument relies on the description at the start of this essay, in which Coetzee was said to
be taking on, in a combative sense, the filiative structure represented by colonialism and its
discourses. Dusklands's explosive aggressivity, specifically registered in moments like these,
is a measure of the extent to which this struggle is not only with the conventions of fiction, but
also with the social and moral framework in South Africa in which those conventions take up
residence.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE DISPLACED SUBJECT
While aggressivity is one of the consequences of Coetzee's Active snuggle with colonialism,
another is the emergence of a displaced subject, a narrator or shadow-narrator who is not one of
the primary agents of colonization, but who lives in the historical circumstances created by such
figures and who suffers and has to endure the subjectivity which such a position entails.
Magda in In the Heart of the Country is clearly such a displaced subject, but it is possible to
discern its emergence in Duskiands. I said earlier that one of the explanations Jacobus Coetzee
gives for his acts is predictable: "I am a tool in the hands of history." After making this
assertion, however, he has misgivings: "Will I suffer?" "I too am frightened of death." He
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dismisses these apprehensions as "a winter story" used to frighten himself and make the
blankets more cosy, but closes with the following reflection:
On the other hand, if the worst comes you will find that I am not irrevocably
attached to life. I know my lessons. I too can retreat before a beckoning finger
through the infinite corridors of my self. I too can attain and inhabit a point of
view from which, like Plaatje, like Adonis, like Tamboer & Tamboer, like the
Namaqua, I can be seen to be superfluous. At present I do not care to inhabit
such a point of view; but when the day comes you will find that whether I am
alive or dead, whether I ever lived or never was born, has never been of real
concern to me. I have other things to think about (114)
A certain ambivalence is pervasive in this conclusion. I believe that it straddles two possible
positions: there is a voice that prompts the larger, existential questions, and another that
replies. The first of these voices represents that aspect of J. M. Coetzee's authorial narration
that would keep alive the options, either for escape—retreating down the corridors of the self—
or for the shadings of moral receptivity or complexity. The second voice, however, the voice
of the reply, is one in which Jacobus Coetzee tries to shut off those options: "at present I do
not care to inhabit such a point of view." It is possible, the paragraph suggests, that under
different conditions. Jacobus Coetzee might tell a different story of himself, a story other than
the ontological one of assertion, preservation and recovery that we have read ("whether I am
alive or dead, whether I ever lived or never was bom")—but only, "when the day comes..."
For the moment, in other words, assertion pure and simple will do.
What the passage enacts, then, in its ambivalence, is a recognition followed by a denial of
complexity, in the work of a writer who values it almost to a fault, but who, in this instance, is
speaking the voice of a fictional subject who carries his own burdened fascination with, and
antagonism for, his inherited culture. Of course, there is extraordinary complexity in
Dusklands, as in every one of Coetzee's novels, but here, for once, (here is an attempt to curtail
it by means of a gesture whose essential function is to preserve the moral imperative of the
author's attempted self-distantiation from the imprisonment of filial and naturalised
connections. Jacobus Coetzee's gesture of closure amounts to a declaration of conscience on
the pan of J. M. Coetzee, one which says, this is the moral record, let us allow it to stand and
speak for itself. It is for this reason, 1 believe, that 1. M. Coetzee never again allows his
authorship to inhabit a narrator as oppressive, as father-like, as Jacobus Qoetzee. (Later, such
figures are the antagonists of the narrators; Magda's father, or Colonel ML) Such a narrator
has to be inhabited for essentially moral reasons, and appropriately at the start of a developing
corpus, but in the final event, Jacobus Coetzee must go, for he is wearying and dull. The
paradox, however, represented in Jacobus Coetzee's gesture is that in tension with this act there
is another, emergent narrative voice, one which asks for openness, and Jacobus Coetzee's
gesture is in opposition to its promptings.
This is the larger meaning, I believe, of the games of self-preservation elaborated by
Jacobus Coetzee on his return journey: "I had been set a task, to find my way home, no mean
(ask, yet one which I, always looking on the brighter side of things, preferred to regard as a
game or a contest" (104). The games comprise a mise en abyme, a recounting, albeit in a
different order, of some of the sequences of the narrative itself: the journey, "primitively
equipped," the punitive raid, captivity and expulsion, and a final game, "the most interesting
one," a Zenonian approach towards death. "Would I be able to to translate myself soberly
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across the told tale, getting back to a dull, fanner's life in the shortest possible time . . . ?"
(105). Games of self-preservation, games of diversion or evasion, are a small but important
part of what fascinated Coetzee about Beckett; we know this from his doctoral work on Watt,
but one might also bring to mind Molloy's elaborate computations of how to rotate sixteen
"sucking stones," one at a time, from his mouth to the pockets of his trousers and greatcoat
{Molloy 69-74). "In each game," says Jacobus Coetzee, "the challenge was to undergo the
history, and the victory was mine if I survived it" (105). One also recalls the opening sentences
of the novel: "My name is Eugene Dawn. I cannot help that Here goes." While the drama of
self-preservation is deadly serious, since it carries ontological weight, it is also continuous with
the moral critique of and indeed, resistance to. Jacobus Coetzee.
In therapy. Dawn is willing to allow the doctors to trace their way through what he calls "the
labyrinth of my history." The phrase neatly captures the authorial ambivalence I have been
discussing. On one hand, history is a maze of entrapment for the subject forced to inhabit it;
on the other, it leads the doctors astray, providing protection for the subject's vulnerabilities.
"My secret is what makes me desirable to you, my secret is what makes me strong.... Sealed
in my chest of treasures, lapped in dark blood, it tramps its blind round and will not die" (49-
50). As we shall increasingly discover. Dawn's resistance to his therapists' attempts to explain
him is representative of larger things in the Coetzee oeuvre. UOuskiands is mainly diagnostic
and critical in emphasis, however, though not absolutely conclusive either—these
considerations are carefully placed in Dawn's closing line, "I have high hopes of finding whose
fault I am"—it also finds a minor corner in which to position a different, displaced narrative
subject, one which will develop and steadily find its own voice, or voices, in the corpus as a
whole.
Magda is the first of the displaced subjects in Coetzee. She is, among other things, a
"spinster with a locked diary" fighting against becoming "one of the forgotten ones of history"
(3). The drama of Heart of the Country lies precisely in her attempts to find and speak a life for
herself in such conditions, a life in which all the usual forms of exchange or relationship—from
ordinary forms of family bonding and sociability to marriage into colonial structures of
kinship—seem either inauthentic or simply unavailable. But I shall reserve this aspect of
Coetzee's authorial struggle with the filiative structures of colonialism for another occasion.
Notes
1 1 have presented this argument more fully in "The Problem of History in the Fiction of J. M.
Coetzee," forthcoming in a collection of critical essays on South African literary culture of the
seventies and eighties, edited by Martin Trump (Ravan Press), and in Poetics Today.
2
 In "Samuel Beckett and the Temptations of Style" (1973) Coetzee brings together a range of studies
of Beckett from his Ph. D disscrtation-a stylistic analysis of Beckett's English fiction- and from
articles on Murphy and Watt (later, Coetzee writes on "Lessness" from the Residua), in order to
examine the movement expression-negation as it recurs (and is progressively refined) in Beckett. The
pattern is explored in terms of metaphor, syntax and finally, Beckett's version of reflexive
consciousness, which revolts irevocably against its own conventions.
3 My essay on the problem of history in Coetzee's fiction makes an attempt in read some of the
influence of these linguistic movements, and to relate them to the various forms of historiographical
and literary revisionism in South Africa in the seventies. In Coetzee's brief memoir on his experience
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in the graduate program at Texas in the late sixties, he speaks of the effect of universal grammar
(mentioning Chomsky and Jerroid Katz) an his early ambitions as a writer, in ways that suggest Chat it
initiated the drift in Coetzee's work away from realism; this trend was of course reinforced by other
reading during the seventies, especially French structuralism,
4 Fiedric Jameson, explaining his sense of the logical development of his interests from Sartre to
Marxist dialectics, has said, "it has always seemed to me that an intense awareness of one's individual
existence serves to provoke and to exacerbate an equally strong and painful sense of what transcends it,
in particular of what we call History" (The Ideologies of Theory , Essays: 1971-1986, Vol. 1:
Situations of Theory xxviii).
3 The extent to which Coetzee was grappling with the problems of filiation as they pertain specifically
to novelistic discourse can be guaged by an article which appears between the publication of the first
two novels, entitled simply "The First Sentence of Yvonne Burgess's The Strike " (1976). Since the
institutionalisalion of structuralism, some of its arguments have become fairly commonplace, but they
were radical at the time. Reading the codes of the Novel from the first line of Burgess's work, Coetzee
argues that the book reaffirms a "social and characterological typology" that ultimately assists in the
consolidation of a "class bond" (48) between readers and writers, and readers and readers. Coetzee'sown
choice of first-person narration is in opposition to this effect This critique is not based primarily on
structuralist models at this stage. The sources are surrealism, Beckett--77ie Unnamabtc -John Baith,
Borges, and the Prague School. Coetzee's models for the presentation of consciousness in fiction go
back firstly to Ford Madox Ford, the subject of Coetzee's 300-page M. A. thesis written for the
University of Cape Town in 1962-1963. Ford called himself and his camp "impressionists," referring
to the attempt to present consciousness directly, as it were. Later, once again, Beckett is influential:
consider the opening sentences ofMoltoy: "I am in my mother's room. It's I who live mere now. I
don't know how I got there." Like Dawn in Part V of "The Vietnam Report," Molloy is writing his
story as a quasi-diagnostic exercise, attended to by doctors. Molloy's opening lines also parallel Dawn's
last: "I have high hopes of finding whose fault I am."
6
 For example, Michael Vaughan describes the two-part structure of Dusklands as defining a mode of
consciousness which he calls "Northern European Protestant," which, although having a racial-
historical origin, is nevertheless "identical" in both contexts ("Literature and Politics" 123); similarly,
Peter Knox-Sbaw argues that the two-part structure involves the attempt to "universalise from the
particular" ("A Metaphysics of Violence" 35).
7
 In die later Penguin edition Coetzee dates the writing of The Vietnam Report. "1972-73." This is
not done in the first Ravan Press edition of 1974. Clearly, by the mid-eighties, Coetzee was concerned
that the first part of Dusklands should be read in context, at least by metropolitan readers.
8
 There was a "New Life Hamlet" project undertaken in the context of RD (Revolutionary, or Rural
Development) strategies in Vietnam (a sub-strategy of what was actually called, with Conradian
overtones, "pacification"), a project to recreate the traditional hamlet in order to encourage resistance to
the infiltration of the Vietcong in South Vietnam (Armbruster 377-385). In Chomsky's The Backroom
Boys, a number of similar though rather more jaunty titles for operations are given: Phoenix, Rolling
Thunder, Speedy Express, Sunrise. Coetzee is allowing history to provide the terms of its own
altegorial explanation. Further parodic connections with actual war-time documents are illustrated later.
' It is perhaps important to note that in Spengler the cyclicity of history, which Dovey (races to Vico
(67), does not imply the regeneration of any single culture. This negativity to which Coetzee is
responsive ought not to be confused with the potentially hegemonic notion of cyclic repetition.
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] 0 In A Theory of Parody: The Teachings ofTwcruitlh-Ccruury Art Forms. Linda Hutchcon
discusses ibe ambivalence in parody between "conservative repetition and revolutionary difference" (77).
The conservative element involves parody's implied respect for tradition, which must qualify the claim,
based cm popular wisom, that parody and satire are interchangeable terms. Coettee's use of parody is
complex and changing, when considered in the light of Hutcheon's analysis. The parodic radicalism of
the early fiction is surely a given. At this stage, Coeuee's critique goes well beyond the bitterness of
satire. In later fiction, however, the parodied texts, such as Robinson Crusoe and XOJCO/UI , apart from
becoming more literary, are also treated more respectfully. The changing forms of parody in Coetzee
provide another useful way of describing the shift from filiation ID affiliation in the oeuvre . Needless
to say, in Ibe early fiction at least (up to an including Sarhjruvu),Coeizee does not share in that
aspect of postmodernism described by Jameson as ihe replacement of parody by the less acute nude of
pastiche ("Postmodernism, Or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism" 64). The term pastiche does not
seem appropriate for the later fiction either, bul for different reasons.
1
' Edward Said notices Uie explicitly congruent interests of traditional anthropology and the U. S.
Department of Defence, in "Representing the Colonized: Anthropology's Interlocutors."
1 2
 Despite the Tet offensive, Kahn argues that the phases toward victory projected in lace 1967 by
General Westmoreland were not completely off target (198-203); looking back on the earlier part of the
war from 1973 (the explicit "present"), Dawn follows in broad outline (he phases predicted by
Westmoreland (19). Kahn discusses the importance of diarisma in unifying people (219-220); Dawn
reflects at some length on this factor in the programming of broadcast propaganda (21 -22). Raymond
Gastil discusses the weaknesses of U. S. propaganda, mentioning specifically the chicu hoi program
(89-90); Dawn does likewise (21). Kahn bemoans the fact that loo few people realise that in Vietnam,
"if a man picks up a rifle and Tires it at you, he is almost never a farmer who simply decided to shoot at
you, but a full-lime guerilla pretending for the moment to be a farmer" (xi); Dawn quotes a member of
an assassination squad as saying, "At a hundred yards who can tell one slope from another? You can
only blow his head off and hope."' (24).
13 Coetzee uses the turn "mythographic" in reference to white nationalist history in "Man's Fate in
the Novels of Alex La Guma," published in the same year as Dusklands.
1 4
 This essay was subsequently reproduced in N, A. Coetzee's compendious (600-page) volume of
Coetzee-geneatogy, published in commemoration of 300 years of the Coetzees in South Africa, Die
Stamouers Coettee en Nagestagte. I am grateful to Catherine Glenn for showing me this volume, and
for alerting me to Bouvard el Piatchet,
1 5
 A word on nomenclature. When the context of discussion implies a protagonist's (or historical
subject's or historian's) perspective, I will use the corresponding terms, i.e. Hottentot, Bushman,
Namaqua; when 1 switch, rarely, from the language of criticism to that of history, I will use more
acceptable terminology, i.e. Khoi or San.
1 6
 In Peter Rotifer's interesting essay "Freeburgbers, the Nama and the politics of the frontier
tradition," which tries to read Coeuee's narrative symptomau'cally (i.e. following Althusser and
Macherey), using the resources of social history and revisionist historiography, Coetzee is criticised for
replicating uncritically die frontier hypothesis, with its emphasis on race, which is characterise of
both liberal and white nationalist accounts of conflict in the political economy of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. The argument breaks down, however, because Coetzee's reflexivity and porodic
intentions are not sufficiently recognised (despite discussion of the "ironic mask"). Coetzee's
constructions find more immediate connection with the contemporary critique of colonial discourse
(though they also predate this critique), which emphasises, following Fanon, its racially and culturally
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Manichean tendencies (see Abdul JanMohamed. Manichean Aesthetics and "The Economy of
Mankhcan Allegory" in Critical Inquiry. In the article. JanMohamed mentions Barbarians. but he
also makes the mistake of assuming that Coetzee's use of 'the Manichean allegory* is uncritical.
1 7
 Again, in these descriptions of frontier tenor, Coetzee is simply giving narrative content to what
was, indeed, a policy of genocide. In the retorts I have not found any descriptions of procedure, as it
were, of which Coelzee's version might be a parodic copy, but there are any number of reports of raids
on camps, with numbers shot (usually men) or captured (usually women and children). In his journal
of 1809, Colonel Collins reports meeting with one commando leader who could account for 3,200 dead,
and another for 2,700 (Moodie V. 7). Coetzee's version, it most be said, refuses the palliative of third-
person objectification that statistics like these offer, providing us instead with the implicated subject.
'8 Dovey notes the emphasis on categorical difference, and the parodic implications of this passage
(86-89), but what I call here the fiction of self-assertion, undermined in the movement of the narrative,
stands in Dovey for attempts by the narrating self to erect itself into autonomy. In my argument, this
view has post-Romantic, universalist implications and therefore undervalues both the ethical dimension
and the contextual strength of the fiction.
1 9
 Dawn's earlier reflections on the authority of print (14-15), as compared with other forms of (he
sign, ought not to be allegorised wholly into a statement about signification only, since the context
has to do with force and its function as attempted self-validation.
20
 I find it difficult to take seriously Dovey's decision to read the novel both backwards and forwards,
ingenious as her findings are. We can agree that interpretation is productive, without this licensing a
capricious re-modelling of the narrative construction.
21 This "CoeKee," as head of the Mythography section, is a silent apologist for scientific positivism
mDuikkinds. How do we interpret the biographical echo? In the novel, the "author" function has
been replaced by the manager and translator of extant documents. It might be that J. M. Coetzee is
ironising the apparently free agency implied by such a role, by associating it with the obviously
interested "objectivity" of the fictional Coetzee.
2 2
 Dovey misreads this episode as a lancing, whereas in fact it is a milking of corrupted flesh. She
does so in order to make of it a motif of penetration, linked with Dawn's stabbing of his son,
representing aUegorically the "poetic gesture of 'oncological self-sufficiency™ (citing Coetzee's essay on
Achterberg), or the "initial phase i n . . . an increasingly radical declaration of textual independence"
(97). This is, I believe, a strong, inaccurate reading.
23 There has been unnecessary confusion over the fact that Klawer's death seems to occur twice. A
simple distinction is required between narrative elements and their treatment or presentation-between
sujtt andfobula. On the first occasion, Klawer goes to his death downriver only in the sense that it is
at this point that the narrator Jacobus Coetzee writes him off; within a paragraph, we read Coetzee's
weary description of Klawer's fever, the result of the accident. When Coetzee leaves him lo die shortly
afterwards, be lingers sentimentally on the moment of their parting for the purpose of sclf-
aggtandisemenL Thus it is only in the narrator's manipulative treatment of events that Klawer "dies
twice." A proper repetition of narrative elements-will) a range of other postmodernist devices-is
developed fully only in Heart of the Country.
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